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Introduction 
Hungary is in political, legal, social, and moral (Bozóki 2011, Palonen 2012, 
Sólyom 2013) crisis. The economic situation is not very good either and worse 
than in comparable countries (Richter 2011). Emigration is high (HVG 2012) and 
the number of would be-emigrants has never been higher during the last twenty 
years (Sík 2012). At the same time as the far right is strong, the country more and 
more finds itself at unease with the EU (Index 2013) and is more and more turning 
towards non-democracies in Asia for assistance and to break out of diplomatic 
isolation – sometimes with difficult outcomes and at the cost of others (DW 2012). 
These developments make it important to improve understanding on what kind of 
ideas and ideologies this nation is guided by nowadays. 
One way of studying such ideologies and orientations is through national 
metanarratives, which can be defined as “visions of national solidarity and 
identification” (Bassin 2012: 553). While globalisation has been impacting 
national identities across the world, the transformations of the late 1980s and early 
1990s—Eastern Europe and the former USSR—are affected by it with a particular 
intensity. Across these regions, old structures of political and economic 
organization were largely destroyed, and some of the most important ideological 
foundations of social cohesion were rejected. In all of the regions affected, this 
served to initiate a difficult and painful quest for what might be called new 
“metanarratives” of nationhood that are meaningful and effective in the conditions 
of the 21stcentury. (Bassin 2012: 553) 
Thus changing national self-perceptions are sometimes coupled with altering 
spatial relations and understandings. In parts of northern Europe, a Scandinavian 
identity has been constructed during the mid-19th century to emphasise the links 
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between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway (Larguèche 2010). In Central and Eastern 
Europe, after 1989 new spatial concepts became necessary to overcome the East-
West divide (Götz et al. 2006: 11-12). While the latter image lingers on (ibid: 10), 
supposedly static spatial perceptions have become much more dynamic (ibid: 12). 
But the significance of these imaginations lies not just in how they are 
performatively and discursively constructed, but also what they are achieving 
(ibid: 16). I focus here on geographical metanarratives in Hungary, not least due to 
the topicality of suchideas there. The paperis guided by the following questions: 
 
• What kind of geographical metanarratives are circulating in 
Hungary today? 
• Which metanarratives are gaining influence, which ones are in 
decline, and why? 
• How do they affect the country’s (geo) political, cultural, and 
economic orientations? 
• Do these metanarratives find a receptive audience in other countries; 
do they overlap with metanarratives elsewhere? 
• Can they affect the country’s political culture, and perhaps even 
democratic norms? 
 
The limited scope of the paper combined with my geographic location during its 
compilation did not allow for fieldwork, interviews, or public opinion surveys (cf. 
O’Loughlin et al. 2006) to collect primary data on the extent to which these 
narratives are impacting society at large – hence my restriction to secondary 
sources. In order to learn about the extent to which the metanarratives are 
instrumentalised in Hungarian politics and economics, developments in Hungary 
and its relations to other countries were followed through different news agencies, 
expert reports, scholarly work as well as own earlier observations. This 
introductory section is followed by a short general overview of metanarratives. 
Section 3 briefly summarises the geographic metanarratives that have been the 
most important in Hungary over the past years. Section 4 provides empirical 
evidence to and an analysis of how and why some of these metanarratives are 
reshaping contemporary Hungary. The last section shortly sums up the 
conclusions. 
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Metanarratives and geographical metanarratives 
‘Geographical narratives’ (252 Google Scholar hits86) as such are thus far 
understudied. Even if we add the hits for ‘spatial narratives’ (1,580), these 
numbers pale into insignificance compared to ‘national narratives’ (10,700), let 
alone to ‘historical narratives’ (45,300). The number of hits is even lower if we 
add the prefix ‘meta’in front of ‘narratives’. Yet I chose to use ‘geographical 
metanarratives’ for several reasons. One, unlike ‘national’, ‘geographical’ includes 
supra- and sub-national levels such as regionalisms or pan-nationalisms. Secondly, 
it indicates that focus is on metanarratives where space is of primary importance. 
Finally, the prefix ‘meta’ signals that we are dealing with grand narratives that a 
large number of people (are expected to) subscribe to, rather than individual 
stories or accounts. 
In critical theory and in postmodernist approaches a metanarrative refers to a 
comprehensive explanation, a narrative about narratives of historical meaning, 
experience or knowledge, which offers a society legitimation through the 
anticipated completion of an often yet unrealised master idea (cf. Appignanesi& 
Garratt 1995: 102-103; Childers & Hentzi 1995: 186). For literary scholars 
Stephens and McCallum (1998: 6), a metanarrative “is a global or totalizing 
cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience”; a 
story about a story, encompassing and explaining other “little stories” within 
conceptual models that make the stories into a whole. In communication and 
strategic communication, a master narrative or metanarrative is a “trans-historical 
narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture” (Halverson et al. 2011: 
14). A master narrative is therefore a particular type of narrative, defined as a 
“coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that share a 
common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience 
expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form” 
(ibid; Stephen & McCallum 1995: 8). 
On the general level, there are at least two problems with metanarratives. On 
the one hand, such grand theories tend to unduly dismiss the naturally existing 
chaos and disorder of the universe, and the power of the individual event (Nouvet 
et al. 2007: xii-iv). On the other hand, metanarratives are created and reinforced by 
power structures and are therefore untrustworthy. Rather than creating grand, all-
encompassing theories, postmodernism therefore attempts to replace 
metanarratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as the diversity of 
human experience (Peters 2001: 7). Thus postmodern narratives will often 
deliberately disturb the formulaic expectations such cultural codes provide 
                                                     
86 The searches referred to in this paragraph were undertaken on February 25, 2014. 
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(D’Haen 1997: 186), pointing thereby to a possible revision of the social code 
(Ermarth 1992: 156). 
Geographical metanarratives can then be seen as imaginations containing 
“distinctive and competing geopolitical orientations toward certain states and 
regions of the world” (O’Loughlin et al. 2006: 130).In her study on Russia, 
Laruelle (2012: 558) defines geographical metanarratives as grand narratives 
consisting of sets of more specific, narrowly focused narratives. They advance a 
supposedly comprehensive and teleological explanation of Russia through a 
master idea—territorial size and location in space are the drivers of Russia’s 
mission in the world, and of the nature of Russia’s state and culture. Going beyond 
data or maps, they have as their main function to develop a theoretical assumption 
and transform it into a legitimate ideological tool. These metanarratives are flags 
that are waved mostly by nationalist-minded intellectual circles, but they also have 
a much wider audience—although it is difficult to measure and analyze—in parts 
of the elite, the educated middle classes whose professions have suffered from loss 
of prestige, some student circles, and members of the general public. Whether in 
radical or moderate, extreme or subtle, forms, these metanarratives constitute a 
doxa—a non-homogenous set of opinions, popular prejudices, and general 
presuppositions that shape contemporary Russian culture and politics. 
Thus a metanarrative “gives sense, purpose, and coherence to discourses of 
history and geography” (Suslov 2012: 577). My definition of geographical 
metanarratives here is that of ideas and visions of communalsolidarity and 
identification that have a geopolitical agenda. Community here refers mainly to 
national, but also sub-, supra- or pan-national levels. 
Geographical metanarratives in Hungary and beyond 
Hungary is a particularly complex case, with a culture based on an unquestionably 
unique language but one that has been shaped by many different peoples including 
Tatars, Turks, Austrians, Germans, Soviets and others (Cartledge 2011). 
Moreover, while all political entities legitimise their existence on a narrative of 
some sort, a number of such – sometimes conflicting – ideologies are circulating 
in Hungary today that are intensively debated across wide segments of the society, 
including the political elite. Given this plethora of geographic metanarrativesit is 
impossible to present a full account, but the following imaginations appear to have 
been the most influential over the past few years. Of these, due to its gaining 
importance neo-Turanism will be dealt with at particular length.  
The ‘return to Europe’ and the return of ‘Central Europe’ 
While the notion of ‘Mitteleuropa’ has long traditions in the German-speaking and 
former Habsburg lands, it was largely buried with the East-West division of 
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Europe during the Cold War. The idea received a new boost through Milan 
Kundera’s famous essay The tragedy of Central Europe (1984). Kundera famously 
argued thatthe historic lands of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary etc naturally belong to 
Europe, from where they were artificially divided but to where they shall one day 
return. Building on the region’s distinctiveness from Eastern Europe in general 
and from Russia in particular, the concept was useful in legitimising several 
countries’ NATO and EU accessions:“[b]y framing Central Europe as an Eastern 
outpost of Europe, it provides a platform from which to make appeals to Western 
assistance” (Kuus 2004: 480, cf. Pridham 2005: 84). Thus its success after 1989 
also depended on a positive reception not just in the countries concerned but also 
among powerful western decision-makers. In Hungary, while the focus on the 
country’s Europeanness has declined somewhat in the last years, the notion of 
‘Central Europe’ is still important (hirado.hu 2013) but has received different 
associations. One, it may serve to distance the country from the (even more) crisis-
struck southern Europe. Secondly, it signifies a region devoted to nation-building 
as opposed to the “empire-building ”Eurocrats and cosmopolitan elites that are 
perceived by the right to dominate Western Europe.  
The ‘Carpathian Basin’ 
A dominant geographic metanarrative in Hungary today is that Hungarians across 
the Carpathian Basin belong together (Kárpátalja 2012). This narrative was a 
taboo during the socialist period. Even if the country has not made formal 
territorial claims since World War II, public institutions including the government 
are today openly supportingthe Székely Land’s aspirations to territorial autonomy 
within Romania (MNO 2013a). While offering citizenship to co-ethnics beyond 
the mother-state’s borders is also practised elsewhere, in Hungary it is coupled 
with a rhetoric of “reuniting the nation” ninety years after the Treaty of Trianon 
(Fidesz 2011), by offering not just citizenship but also for instance the right to vote 
in the country’s national elections (MNO 2012). Pan-Hungarian institutions are 
being set up throughout the region for various groups such as entrepreneurs 
(Kormányportál 2012), artists (MNO 2013b), and so on. Rather than just 
governmental organisations, such initiatives are also taken by NGOs (TKMM 
2012, KMJA 2013). Importantly, these actions are also popular among Hungarians 
and their political representatives in the neighbouring countries (Fidesz-EU 2013, 
MNO 2013c). Last but not least, the Carpathian Basinas a “unitary geographic 
space” (Dövényi 2012) also enjoys revived attention by a number of Hungarian 
scholars across the region (Gyuris 2014), not leastbased on its ethnic composition 
(Kocsiset al. 2006, Kocsis&Tátrai 2013). 
Neo-Turanism and other Eurasian metanarratives 
Another type of metanarratives with significant geographic relevance is winning 
terrain in Hungary. In practice this includes a number of more or less well-
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established ideas that share an emphasis on the ancient Hungarians’ historical, 
cultural and even some linguistic links with various peoples in Asia. Neo-
Turanism appears as the most influential among these narratives. The ideology of 
pan-Turanism has been a political movement for the union of the Uralo-Altaic 
peoples and languages (Murinson 2006: 945). It has historically been most 
influential in Turkey (overlapping with pan-Turkism) and Hungary, though during 
somewhat different periods. In Turkey, it was mostly popular in the years 
preceding World War I (ibid) and then in the 1950s and ’60s. While gradually 
gaining influence from the late nineteenth century on, in Hungary the heydays of 
Turanism were rather in the interwar period (Hanebrink 2009, Vardy 1983: 37-39). 
Still, during that time pan-Turanism did serve as some common ground for 
collaboration between the two countries to stem the Russian threat (Murinson 
2006: 945). But while it was more and more replaced by Kemalism in Turkey, in 
Hungary Turanism was gradually merging with Fascism87 (Hanebrink 2009: 118). 
Partly as a consequence, the ideology was fully discredited in the socialist era. 
During that time, the official version of history adopted the Finno-Ugric link – to 
the extent that questions of ethno-genesis enjoyed any attention at all. With the 
change of system a plethora of new-old ideas saw light, supported by more or less 
scientific literature. While several ideas still promote a Finno-Ugric kinship of 
some sort, others explicitly reject such a link. Many new-old theories in fact trace 
the Hungarians’ roots in the Turan (a historical region north of Iran), Sumer, or 
elsewhere in Central Asia. The area south of the Urals has long been a strong 
suspectof the location of ancient Magyars, with a recent shift towards what is 
today western Kazakhstan (Bíró et al. 2009).  
As we will see in the next section, whatmakes the study of these narratives 
particularly topical is that they enjoy growing popularity among sizable segments 
of the Hungarian population at a time when the country’s leadership is increasing 
efforts to strengthen connections with more and more states in Asia. At the same 
time, some of these imaginations find an audience and even have their equivalents 
in several Eurasian societies.For instance, neo-Ottomanism is gaining influence in 
Turkey (Murinson 2006) and neo-Eurasianism is increasingly popular in Russia 
(Laruelle 2012). 
                                                     
87 It only proves the malleability of such metanarratives (cf. Bassin 2012: 555) that while Turanism 
for some served to emphasise Hungary’s Eurasian links, for others it served to strengthen what 
they believed were shared (geopolitical) interests with Germany. 
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Towards an“Eurasianisation” of Hungary? 
The strengthening of Eurasian connections in Hungary can today be traced in 
genealogic interest, popular culture, political ideology and foreign policy alike.  
Genealogy and national self-images 
It should be noted that the origin of the Hungarians has often been and continues 
to be a subject of intensive popular, scientific and pseudoscientific debate 
(Marinov 2009). Most researchers today agree that the tribes that at some point 
called them selves Magyars have their origin in central Asia, but there is 
disagreement over issues as their more precise “original” location or when the 
migration process began westwards. Similarly, the relation of Hungarian to other 
Finno-Ugric languages is quite debated. Representations of these relations have 
also followed political orientations: when Hungary was relatively well-off around 
the fin-de-siècle, kinship with the then so-called “fish-stinking Finns” was rather 
neglected; at the dawn of the Cold War it was the Finns who ignored their 
unfortunately positioned “relatives”. All the while few Hungarians reject the 
reality of their nation today being composed of people of various origins. While a 
recent genetic study (Bíró et al. 2009) in fact found overlaps between the 
Kazakhstani Madjar tribes and the dominant Magyar (i.e. Hungarian) population 
in Hungary, another study from the same year concluded that three fourths of 
Hungary’s current male population has a genetic pool proving at least a 30,000-
year-presence in Europe (HVG2009). 
It is of course not the goal here to find out the “real” origins of Hungarians 
and their kin. Instead, focus is on various ideas, imaginations and self-perceptions 
that have the potential to link this society to others. Of particular importance here 
is the question which images emphasise Asian, Eurasian, or European connections. 
While the majority of Hungarians probably still see their nation as a primarily 
European one, certain ideas and studies on its ethno-genesis can “disturb” such a 
picture. Discourses around an Asian origin are particularly delicate given the 
importance of Christianity in Hungary’s history, as the country has seen itself as 
an outpost of western civilization and its defender against “Oriental barbarism” 
(Vardy 1983: 37) since the first king and founding father of the state Stephen I 
adopted Christianity around the year 1000. This self-perception was especially 
accentuated during the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and during 
Turkish rule (1541-1686), with both events featuring high in the nation’s historical 
conscience. Illustrative here is a popular novel on the initially successful 
protection of the Castle of Eger against Ottoman troops in 1552 by the extensively 
outnumbered Hungarian forces (Gárdonyi 1901/1991), which is part of the 
national curriculum. Anti-Turkish feelings are also represented in folk songs, 
poems, and nursery rhymes (Akçalı 2013: 44). This self-image only started to 
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weaken with the Habsburg rule, at a time when Hungary was increasingly 
distancing itself from Austria in the nineteenth century. 
Popular culture 
There is today a growing interest in what was or could have been the ancient 
culture of the Turanian, Hun, and Magyar tribes. This includes their everyday-
practices (including archery, horse-riding, handcraft, building and dwelling in 
yurts) but also pre-Christian beliefs such as Shamanism and various forms of 
Paganism (Kolozsi 2012). While festivals and different gatherings and 
associations devoted to such activities and cultural practices have now been 
around for some years, these earlier rather amateur events seem to be gradually 
becoming more professional, and growing in size. Importantly, Kurultáj (Figure 
1), a major one among these festivals – organised by the Magyar-Turán 
Foundation (Kurultáj 2012) four times so far – in 2012 became for the first time a 
semi-official event by benefitting from a public support of approximately 310,000 
USD by the Hungarian government (Ehl 2012). The event attracted up to a quarter 
million visitors (ibid), including high-ranking officials from countries considered 
to belong to the Turanian family of nations (i.e. Turkey, the Central Asian 
republics and a number of ethnic groups from Russia). In November 2012, a 
smaller but similar event with Kazakh riders called ‘Vostochniye Skachki’ 
(Eastern Gallop) was organised in Eger (HEOL 2012), a city paradoxically 
associated with a heroic battle against the Turks in Hungarian historiography (see 
above). In the recent past, the area around Szigetvár (another Hungarian town 
famous for fierce battles against Ottoman forces) has increasingly been 
transforming into a region attracting Turkish tourists (Kálnoky 2013). 
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Figure 1: Searching for Turan at the Kurultáj festival. 
 
Source: Kurultaj.hu 
Politics and foreign policy 
Among the parliamentary parties neo-Turanism is openly embraced by the far-
right Jobbik (Akcali&Korkut 2012), and to some extent by the governing party 
Fidesz (Ehl 2012). In April 2013 Jobbik even proposed to create a national day for 
the Turanian kin peoples; even if the majority of MPs abstained from beans this 
time (NOL 2013), the proposition itself is telling. While Fidesz may be divided on 
the embrace of Turanism, one of its MPs – Sándor Lezsák – is the Kurultáj 
festival’s patron. Moreover, it was another Fidesz MP –László Kövér, the Speaker 
of the National Assembly – who proposed to support the event. Most recently, 
while condemning some of the EU’s criticism towards Hungary Kövér said that if 
this is the direction the EU takes, then Hungary should consider leaving the union 
(EurActiv 2014). 
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The notion of an “Eurasianisation of Hungary” (I have not seen it being laid 
forward elsewhere) is to some extent inspired by the idea of a “Putinisation of 
Hungary”, a label that several journalists (TWP 2010, Rauscher 2012, Kirchick 
2012, Lindberg 2013) described the country’s development with since current 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took power in spring 2010. While a comparison of 
Hungary with Russia is probably far-fetched (The Economist 2010), it is meant to 
criticise the leadership style and a number of policies of the Hungarian 
government. Illustratively, in early 2014 it was suddenly announced that Hungary 
agreed with Russia on co-financing the construction of new units of the country’s 
only nuclear power plant: despite being the largest investment in Hungary since 
1989, the content of the intergovernmental agreement has not been made public 
(Sadecki&Kardaś 2014) and was strongly criticised for not having been preceded 
by consulting experts, let alone NGOs and other interest groups. Criticism is more 
generally targeted at the creation of enemy images (Koenen 2011), but more 
importantly, at constitutional reforms that may serve to weaken democratic 
institutions (Halmai 2011, Küpper 2011, Sólyom 2013) and at laws endangering 
the freedom of press (Vásárhelyi 2011). 
In a wider context, some (e.g. Haraszti 2012) see a trend of Hungary moving 
towards a “Eurasian” style of governance characteristic of so-called ‘managed 
democracies’ such as Ukraine, Russia (Demdigest 2012), and a number of East 
Asian countries. According to Haraszti, such a model is based on an often unclear 
division between public and private ownership and management, and a strong state 
influence in matters traditionally treated as belonging to the private sphere in 
liberal democracies. Accordingly, explicit criticism – if not dismissal – of a liberal 
democratic order are clearly present for instance in the Hungarian Prime 
Minister’s recent utterance: “I don’t think that our European Union membership 
precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national foundations”, 
going on to cite Russia, Turkey and China as successful models to emulate, “none 
of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even democracies” (WSJ 2014). 
According to some experts (Demdigest 2012), the stake is high as other young 
democracies in Europe may be following suit. Russia has in fact offered Hungary 
(Barabás 2011), Bulgaria (novinite.com 2011), and Serbia (SNP Nashi 2011) to 
join its Eurasian Union. 
Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has been emphasising the importance 
of an on-going ‘race for the East’ –that is entering new alliances with for instance 
China in light of the economic crisis (Máté 2012, cf. Kálnoky 2013). A number of 
concrete measures were recently taken that signal a Hungarian (re)orientation 
eastwards. Through the foreign policy of ‘Opening to the East’ (Keletinyitás), 
particular attention is directed towards regions like Turkey (Kálnoky 2013), China, 
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Russia88 and Central Asia, not least Kazakhstan (Fidesz Eger 2012). Educational 
exchange programs have been started with countries like Azerbaijan (Index 2012) 
and Jordan (MHO 2013). Chambers of commerce are being set up in for instance 
Azerbaijan to attract Hungarian enterprises (Index 2012). Most recently, Hungary 
closed its embassy in Estonia while it is opening a new one in Mongolia (NOL 
2014). While trading with non-democracies is nothing unique to Hungary, what is 
distinctive is the nexus between such policies and ideology and culture. 
Hungary’s difficulties with dealing with non-democracies were illustrated by 
a severe incident in autumn 2012 when itsent home an Azerbaijani officer who 
murdered an Armenian colleague in Budapest. While Baku promised his sentence 
would continue in his home country, in reality he was treated as a national hero 
and was even promoted upon return in Azerbaijan. Hungarian media and 
opposition scent a dirty deal behind the scenes, saying that Azerbaijan had 
promised to buy bonds for 3 billion euros from the cash-strapped Hungarian 
government in exchange for the officer’s release (DW 2012). Developing contacts 
with different countries is of course not negative in itself, but with exactly whom, 
how, and at what price? 
Conclusion 
Geographical metanarratives can be a powerful force and, not least when 
instrumentalised in politics, often serve to legitimise a society’s geopolitical and 
cultural (re)orientations. Therefore such metanarratives tend exactly to emerge as 
mobilising tools at times when new such orientations are desired by power elites 
and/or important segments of the society more generally. As I tried to show, 
Hungary is both an illustrative and a topical case of a country undergoing a partial 
but significant reorientation. While it clearly saw its place in Europe as well as 
within the country’s current borders up until recently, considerable efforts 
havenewly been undertaken to approach certain Eurasian societies; not least 
Turkey, Russia, and in Central Asia. Such orientations are not just based on pure 
geopolitical and geo-economic rationales (as in a number of western countries), 
but are also supported by new-old metanarratives such as neo-Turanism and other 
forms of “Eurasianisms”. By complementing the purely commerce-based activities 
with cooperation in fields such as education, cultural exchange and politics, 
Hungary is more and more linked to hybrid or non-democracies also politically, at 
                                                     
88 When it was in opposition during 2002-2010, Fidesz explicitly objected for example to the South 
Stream gas pipeline on the grounds of avoiding increased energy dependence on Russia; but it has 
recently agreed with Gazprom to welcome this project (Presseurop 2013). 
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a time when the government has been criticised of semi-authoritarian tendencies 
and democratic deficits. At the same time, a number of Eurasian countries – 
notably Turkey and Russia – appear to welcome such a reorientation of Hungary, 
as well as of other countries in (south) eastern Europe. This can be explained by 
the fact that Turkey’s rising neo-Ottomanism and Russia’s growing neo-
Eurasianism are promoting geopolitical agendas that are in line with Hungary’s 
‘Opening to the East’ and neo-Turanism. 
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